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ECONOMIC EMERGENCY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Bernadette Meyler*
INTRODUCTION
Answering the question of whether the rule of law is waxing or
waning might depend on which vision of the rule of law is under con-
sideration. Academic work extolling the merits of the rule of law both
domestically and internationally abounds today, yet the meanings of
the phrase itself seem to proliferate. Two of the most prominent con-
texts in which rule of law rhetoric appears are "economic develop-
ment" and "states of emergency."'
In the area of private law, dissemination of the rule of law across
the globe and, in particular, among emerging market countries is often
deemed a prerequisite for enhancing economic development, because
it ensures that foreign investments will not be summarily expropriated
and contractual rights will not be frustrated by governmental interfer-
ence. Much of public law scholarship has, in turn, examined whether
and in what form the rule of law, which is often seen as a basic re-
quirement for a liberal political order, can be retained during times of
emergency.
While the economic development and state of emergency contexts
for rule of law discussions appear quite distinct, they converge in at
least one situation-economic emergency. Paradigmatic cases of eco-
nomic emergency include the Great Depression, the Argentine fiscal
crisis of 2001, and the East Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s.
Arguably more marginal instances might comprehend the economic
consequences of Hurricane Katrina, the economic dimensions of a po-
tential bird flu pandemic, or the threatened financial chaos of the Y2K
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I have benefited greatly from the oppor-
tunity to present this piece at the Twelfth Annual Clifford Symposium analyzing the question "Is
the Rule of Law Waning in America?" and from comments at various points by Kerry Abrams,
Brandon Garrett, Doug Kysar, and David Zaring. I am grateful to Jessica Felker for excellent
research assistance.
1. Both conceptions of the rule of law were in evidence at this Symposium. Compare Gillian
K. Hadfield, Don't Forget the Lawyers: The Role of Lawyers in Promoting the Rule of Law in
Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 401 (2007), with Kim Lane Scheppele, Law
in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1001 (2004). For further treatments of their contours and genealogies, see infra notes 59-60.
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computer crisis. Either the economic development approach or the
state of emergency approach could lead to the conclusion that none of
these situations justify an abrogation of core rule of law values, but
this puts aside the question of which values do lie at the center of the
rule of law.
This Article contends that the rule of law should be conceived flexi-
bly enough to permit governmental intervention that may temporarily
disrupt the economic rights-but not the personal liberty or political
participation rights-of individuals during economic emergencies.
Without addressing whether and to what extent the government
should interfere in the economic sphere, this Article argues that sev-
eral justifications based on the democratic vision underlying our con-
stitutional system warrant treating the suspension of economic rights
differently from the suspension of rights such as habeas corpus or the
vote .2
Although recent scholarship has focused on the effect of states of
emergency on various constitutional orders, little attention has been
devoted to differentiating the sources of the emergency and the kinds
of rights that emergencies affect. While commentators pay lip service
to the idea that emergencies come in three varieties-political, eco-
nomic, and natural-most devote their attention solely to the first of
these categories, focusing on situations of war and other violent con-
flict.3 This obscures important distinctions between the types of in-
fringements upon constitutional rights that emergencies may generate.
As a result, those who have recently begun to discuss measures
abridging economic rights during emergencies have insisted that such
encroachments should be considered anathema to us-just as steps
restricting other kinds of rights are. 4  Two contrasting solutions
emerge out of this line of scholarship. While one insists that economic
and other rights should be preserved regardless of the surrounding
circumstances, the other maintains that infringements upon personal
and political freedoms should instead be considered just as permissi-
2. For a sweeping history of economic theory from Smith to Keynes, and the various schools
of economic thought that developed over that period with respect to state management of the
economy, see generally MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT (5th ed. 1997).
3. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitu-
tional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1025 n.44 (2003) ("Emergencies have been traditionally classified
into three major categories: grave political crises (including international armed conflicts, ter-
rorist attacks, riots, and rebellions), economic crises such as the Great Depression, and natural
disasters and force majeure events.").
4. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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ble as those upon economic rights, and that these infringements
should simply be compensable after the fact.5
This Article does not argue that the respective natures of political
and economic emergencies render one more compelling as a source of
extraordinary governmental action than the other. Each may result in
devastating harm. The oft-repeated mantra after the events of 9/11
that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact," 6 which reminds us that
constitutional guarantees to liberties like due process should not over-
ride the necessity of preserving the social order itself, could be applied
equally to the economic arena.
To the extent that fixed resources might be available during a par-
ticular economic emergency, insisting on an absolutist interpretation
of the constitutional right to property or freedom of contract could
result in the utter collapse of the economic and political systems. Nor
are courts necessarily more capable of evaluating the extent of a
threat posed by a posited economic crisis than one presented by po-
tential terrorists. 7 In both instances, the possibility of harm arising out
of particular kinds of emergencies may be quite substantial, and at the
same time, the validity of the government's claims that individual
rights must be curtailed in order to preserve the polity may not be
readily ascertainable by the courts.
Rather than attempting to distinguish the situations by appealing to
the greater necessity, or lack thereof, of governmental action in one
sphere or the other, this Article insists that, during emergencies, a dif-
ference may exist between infringing upon economic rights, on the
one hand, and liberty or political rights, on the other. Whether these
areas can, in fact, be separated depends ultimately upon the kind of
5. Compare infra note 33 and accompanying text (taking the first position), with Eugene
Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 755, 792 (2004) (adopting the second position and suggesting that certain constitutional
rights, including those of habeas corpus, would be better protected by liability rules than by
property rules in cases of emergency, and basing this model on the one currently employed
under the Takings Clause).
6. Erwin Chemerinsky, Detainees, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (2005) (citing Terminiello v.
Chicago. 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
7. In both cases, expert information may be required. This problem has surfaced in relation to
the war on terror. The Bush Administration has often alleged that it must act on the basis of
intelligence data that it cannot risk making public by producing it in court, and which the judici-
ary is therefore not able to evaluate. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198,
227 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing the "mosaic theory," by which terrorists might put together certain
pieces of information that appear innocuous individually, and that judges would not be able to
differentiate from other, less sensitive, materials), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003). Various
scholars have also noted that courts may not be the government institutions best suited for mak-
ing judgments about economic strategies. See Wayne McCormack, Property and Liberty-Insti-
tutional Competence and the Functions of Rights, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 55-56 (1994).
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democracy envisioned as undergirding the constitutional system. 8 In
the United States, following John Hart Ely's influential argument in
Democracy and Distrust, many agree that judicial review under the
Constitution should, at a minimum, protect access to participation in
the political process. 9 A necessary entailment of this minimum stan-
dard for our constitutional democracy is that rights like habeas corpus,
freedom of speech and assembly, and voting should not be suspended
or otherwise abridged during an emergency beyond what the text of
the Constitution permits, at the risk of the failure of our democratic
system.'0 No similar degree of significance attaches to economic
rights within our constitutional order, or so this Article contends.
The text of the Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence pro-
vide further support for distinguishing among the categories of rights
infringed during an emergency. One of the primary passages protect-
ing economic rights, the Takings Clause, specifies "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."" This
language envisions the possibility that the government will deprive in-
dividuals of their property, as long as it provides "just compensation."
This is consistent with the Court's interpretation of the Contract
Clause in the leading case in that area, Home Building and Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, which allowed for delay in the realization of eco-
nomic rights.12 The manner in which the Court has construed the
Contract Clause and the history behind that provision suggest a no-
tion of economic interdependence that should permit modification of
property rights to promote the health of the overall economic order.
8. Professor Jeremy Waldron has recently argued, along similar lines, that certain aspects of
our law, like the ban on torture, furnish "archetypes," which "sum[ ] up or make[ ] vivid to us the
point, purpose, principle, or policy of a whole area of law." Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Posi-
tive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1723 (2005).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
10. This is not to say that such rights should be construed as absolutely protecting individual
liberty. On the contrary, in the context of the First Amendment, it is commonly acknowledged
that time, place, and manner restrictions can be placed upon speech. See Barry P. McDonald,
Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1355-60 (2006). Likewise, the writ of habeas corpus would not
be available if Congress suspended it under the right circumstances. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2;
see also infra note 42 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. 290 U.S. 398 (1934); see also infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. At a late stage in
the editing process for this Article, a fascinating piece by Professor Sanford Levinson appeared.
In that work, Levinson relates the opinion in Blaisdell to theories about emergency and the rule
of law to the writings of Carl Schmitt in a way that overlaps in several respects with this Article.
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699
(2006); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in
Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807 (2006) (responding to Levinson).
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This flexible notion of the contours of economic rights during emer-
gencies affects the rule of law, at least as it is conceived by the eco-
nomic development literature, which draws heavily on Friedrich
Hayek's classic text The Constitution of Liberty.1 3 It does not, how-
ever, represent the only alternative. The Argentine Supreme Court,
for instance, took a rather different tack in addressing the measures
that then-President Fernando de la Rtia adopted in response to the
fiscal crisis of 2001, invalidating measures like the restriction on re-
moving more than $250 per week from savings accounts. 14
This Article simply contends that a particular vision of democracy-
one that has historically been associated with our constitutional sys-
tem-supports a more flexible interpretation of the effects of emer-
gency on economic rights than on personal liberty and political
participation rights. For those rights exercised against the backdrop of
economic regulation, the Constitution may remain strict during emer-
gencies-continuing to tie Ulysses to his mast-while accommodating
governmental interests in economic stability. 15 For other kinds of per-
sonal liberty or political participation claims, such accommodation is
more problematic, and more likely to result in deformations of the
protections that the Constitution provides.
Part II delineates the varieties of emergency and suggests several
means of distinguishing among those that are political, natural, and
economic. Part III examines the potential intersection of the two
dominant strands of rule of law scholarship in the context of economic
emergency, a context that illuminates how analysis under these dispa-
rate rule of law strands may reach divergent results. The subject of
economic emergency has remained relatively unexamined by either
branch of rule of law work, because the economic development line
does not focus on emergencies at all, and the emergency line largely
avoids treating economic emergencies. Part IV argues that both a
particular version of democratic theory and the history and interpreta-
tion of the economic rights clauses of the U.S. Constitution support
differentiating between infringements of economic and other rights
during emergency-regardless of what occasioned the emergency situ-
13. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); see also infra notes 68-77 and ac-
companying text.
14. ANGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 169 (2006).
15. For the notion that a constitution creates a pre-commitment analogous to Ulysses' gesture
of tying himself to his ship's mast in order to avoid responding to the appeal of the Sirens' song,
see generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT,
AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY
AND IRRATIONALITY (1979). For vigorous criticism of the analogy, see Jeremy Waldron, A
Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 47-48 (1993).
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ation. Reference will be made to the Argentine Constitution and its
interpretation by the Argentine Supreme Court as illustrating a con-
stitutional system that rests on somewhat distinct norms.
II. THE VARIETIES OF EMERGENCY
In its classic contours, an emergency calls for rapid and decisive ac-
tion by the executive branch, including the act of designating the situ-
ation an emergency or a "state of exception." According to German
jurist Carl Schmitt, sometimes dubbed the legal theorist of the Third
Reich, "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."'1 6 Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone, concurring in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, a case in-
validating two convictions by military tribunal in Hawaii, similarly ex-
plained that "[t]he Executive has broad discretion in determining
when the public emergency is such as to give rise to the necessity of
martial law, and in adapting it to the need."' 17 According to this con-
ventional account, the rest of government will find itself stymied by
the emergency, either because the situation requires a rapid response
that demands circumventing deliberative democratic processes, or be-
cause the emergency has already undermined the operations of the
other branches themselves: "[There is a] power which resides in the
executive branch of the Government to preserve order and insure the
public safety in times of emergency, when other branches of the Gov-
ernment are unable to function, or their functioning would itself
threaten the public safety." 18
Declaring an emergency means setting aside a normal state of af-
fairs or acknowledging that such a departure has already occurred.
The Executive's principal concern in an emergency is to preserve a
nation whose survival is somehow imperiled. The juridical concept of
the emergency is thus connected with the notion of raison d' tat, iden-
tified as "the doctrine that whatever is required to insure the survival
of the state must be done by the individuals responsible for it, no mat-
ter how repugnant such an act may be to them in their private capacity
as decent and moral men."1 9
16. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT" OF SOVER-
EIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). See generally JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY,
CARL SCHMiTr: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983).
17. 327 U.S. 304, 336 (1946) (Stone, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 335. For a discussion of the temporal rationale for suspending deliberative democ-
racy during an emergency and the flaws in this reasoning, see generally ELAINE SCARRY, WHO
DEFENDED THE COUNTRY? (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2003).
19. C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER 4-5 (1957). Although initially derived from Italian political theory, this concept
[Vol. 56:539
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Emergencies have been rendered notorious, not only by the experi-
ence of the Third Reich and Hitler's ascent to power on the basis of
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution,20 but also by the deleterious
consequences in India and South Africa of making emergencies semi-
permanent. 2' Based on these infamous histories, recent constitutional
efforts in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere have at-
tempted to curb abuses by explicitly granting the legislature the power
to declare or ratify an emergency or limit its duration. 22 Following the
events of 9/11 in the United States-and the rapid legislative response
represented by the USA PATRIOT ACT 3-many have suggested ex-
plicitly permitting emergency constitutionalism, but simultaneously
limiting the scope of executive action during emergencies. Along
these lines, Professor Bruce Ackerman has proposed a
"supermajoritarian escalator," under which the President would "be
given the power to act unilaterally only for the briefest period-long
enough for the legislature to convene and consider the matter, but no
also found expression in John Locke's discussion of prerogative in the Second Treatise of Gov-
ernment. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-75 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
20. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the emergency provision, delegated powers and
military capacity to the President when "the public safety and order of the German Reich is
seriously disturbed or endangered," and also permitted the suspension of civil liberties through
presidential fiat. DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCIMI1T", HANS KEL-
SEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 33 (1997). In fact, when Article 48 was implemented in
1932, it signaled the commencement of Hitler's rise to power. Field Marshal von Hindenburg,
the Reichsprasident, issued a decree allowing the Chancellor of the Reich, Franz von Papen, to
be the Commissioner for Prussia, thus effectively suppressing the SPD, the main socialist party
and the principal vehicle of resistance to the Nazis. Id. The Prussian government did not resort
to violence:
[It] chose to challenge the constitutional validity of the decree before the Staatsgericht-
shof-the court set up by the Weimar Constitution to resolve constitutional disputes
between the Federal Government and the Lander. The court by and large upheld the
decree in late October, by which time the SPD was no longer an effective force.
Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
21. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., CONST. EST. arts. 65, 129 (granting Parliament the power to declare an emer-
gency on the proposal of the president or government); see also John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pas-
quino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 210,
216-17 (2004) (maintaining that "[a] new model of emergency powers ... has evolved over the
past half century, at least for the advanced or stable democracies," one that relies on legislative
action to delegate emergency powers to the executive branch).
23. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001); see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wire-
tap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 75 (2004) ("The USA PATRIOT Act was passed just six weeks after
the September 11 attacks, during a period in which legislators were literally shut out of their
offices due to anthrax attacks. Commentators have complained about the limited deliberation
that preceded the USA PATRIOT Act, which was passed despite the fact that members of Con-
gress did not have a chance to view the actual text." (citations omitted)).
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longer. '24 Subsequent action would be approved only by increasing
congressional supermajorities. 25
Despite these recent attempts to bring U.S. constitutional treat-
ments of emergency into some conformity with the approaches of
other nations, a crucial distinction remains: the U.S. Constitution
lacks any explicit provision for states of emergency.26 The most rele-
vant constitutional clauses include those articulating Congress's power
to declare war, 27 to call forth the militia,2 8 and to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.29 Although these powers all seemingly accrue to Con-
gress, during emergencies the President has often issued an executive
order or simply taken what he asserts is necessary action. 30 Further-
more, the absence of an emergency clause in the Constitution has left
elaboration of the Constitution's fate during such situations to the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the nature and extent of the political
branches' powers.
In both domestic and international contexts, commentators have
largely neglected to examine the various forms that emergencies take,
whether political, economic, or natural.31 The most prevalent associa-
tions with emergency today involve the imminent threat of violence
that places the continuation of the state in jeopardy. This has not,
however, always been the case. Economic emergencies have some-
times swept the United States-most notably during the Great De-
pression. 32 Schmitt emphasized the twentieth-century tendency
toward declarations of economic emergency, identifying it as omni-
24. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (2004).
25. Id.
26. This contrasts with the practice of many twentieth-century constitutions internationally,
including that of Argentina. CONST. ARG. § 23, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Consti-
tutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html ("In the event of domestic disorder or foreign attack endan-
gering the full enforcement of this Constitution ... the province or territory which is in a turmoil
shall be declared in [a] state of siege and the constitutional guarantees shall be suspended
therein."); see also CONST. ARO. § 76 (providing for the delegation of legislative power to the
Executive during emergencies for a period of time to be specified by Congress); CONST. POL. art.
228.
27. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
28. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 15.
29. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
30. For example, during the Civil War, President Lincoln took it upon himself to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus. Kim Lane Scheppele, North American Emergencies: The Use of Emer-
gency Powers in Canada and the United States, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 213, 218-19 (2006).
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
32. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (considering the
effect of economic emergency on the construction and application of the Contract Clause); Mi-
chele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387 (2005) (identifying fed-
eral disaster relief efforts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as furnishing a
foundation for the more expansive view of Congress's power realized during the New Deal).
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present and incompatible with liberal democracy. 33 Likewise, the ex-
tent of the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the
Asian Tsunami of 2004 suggests that emergency theory may be rele-
vant to natural disasters.
Labeling emergencies political, economic, or natural raises ques-
tions as to which aspect of the emergency is designated. Are all emer-
gencies that begin in financial crisis-like the Great Depression or the
Argentine fiscal crisis of 2001-economic in nature? What if natural
emergencies like Hurricane Katrina or the Asian Tsunami have
profound political and economic consequences? And what if the
kinds of individual rights affected by an economic or natural emer-
gency are ones connected with individual liberty or the political pro-
cess? Our Constitution-to the extent that it concedes the possibility
of something like an emergency at all-seems to privilege political
emergencies over other forms. Nevertheless, even within the United
States, there may be rhetorical advantages that accrue to the govern-
ment upon labeling an emergency natural or economic as opposed to
political. No clear justification for placing priority upon either form of
emergency has, however, emerged. Indeed, to the extent that the po-
tential consequences of each remain equally dire, action taken to ad-
dress the emergency might be thought to be similarly justified. What
the government must show in each instance-and what is most diffi-
cult for courts to assess-is that the emergency actually requires the
steps that are being taken, and that a compelling necessity does in fact
exist. The greater rhetorical power of invoking natural or economic
emergency-despite the lack of constitutional concern with these situ-
ations-may stem precisely from the popular view that these varieties
of emergency represent ineluctable forces to which the government
can only react and with which it is not capable of negotiating.34
33. William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869,
1883-85 (2000) (analyzing Schmitt's discussions of economic emergencies). There may be a very
recent resurgence of interest in the phenomenon. See Rebecca M. Kahan, Comment, Constitu-
tional Stretch, Snap-Back, and Sag: Why Blaisdell Was a Harsher Blow to Liberty than Kore-
matsu, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279 (2005). Those commentators who have analyzed declarations of
economic emergency have generally condemned them alongside, or even more than, militaristic
ones. See id. at 1311 (contending that "though both violent and economic emergencies stretch
the fabric of constitutional limitations with the sheer force of necessity, the nature of circum-
stances surrounding either executive or legislative response limiting economic liberty causes its
effect to linger long past the time when a similar limitation on civil liberty will have expired");
see also Scheuerman, supra, at 1869-70 ("[L]iberal legal and political analysts have too often
ignored the seriousness of the normative and institutional problems posed by the surprisingly
pervasive reliance on emergency devices to grapple with the exigencies of economic affairs.").
34. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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Although philosopher Giorgio Agamben's writings on the state of
exception generally devote little attention to the question of how an
emergency arises, his discussion of "necessity" in State of Exception35
suggests why the rhetoric of natural emergency is so powerful. In ana-
lyzing the state of necessity, Agamben turns to the work of Santi Ro-
mano and, in particular, his response "on the occasion of the
earthquake of Messina and Reggio Calabria on December 28, 1908."'36
Although Agamben himself insists that the state of siege brought
about by the earthquake "is only apparently a different situation"
than a political disturbance, and that "a state of siege [was] ultimately
proclaimed for reasons of public order-that is, to suppress the rob-
beries and looting provoked by the disaster,"37 the fact that natural
disaster could be posited as the originary spark bringing about the
necessity retains a rhetorical significance. Indeed, it is precisely this
aspect that accords with what Agamben identifies as "the extreme
aporia against which the entire theory of the state of necessity ulti-
mately runs aground," and which "concerns the very nature of neces-
sity, which writers continue more or less unconsciously to think of as
an objective situation. ' 38 Although Agamben endorses the stance of
"those jurists who show that, far from occurring as an objective given,
necessity clearly entails a subjective judgment, and that obviously the
only circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are
declared to be SO," ' 3 9 he neglects the role of the natural emergency in
facilitating the naive view of necessity.
Several examples from the United States demonstrate the perplex-
ing interaction between the constitutional justifications for govern-
ment action in situations of political emergency and the popular
acceptance of emergency measures taken during natural disasters or
economic crises. For example, the executive and legislative branches
claim greater scope for the exercise of their power during times of
war. After 9/11, the executive branch argued that Article II grants the
President something like a penumbra of powers greater than those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. Thus, in Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, the Government asserted that "the Executive possesses plenary
authority to detain [citizens considered 'enemy combatants'] pursuant
35. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005)
(2003).
36. Id. at 17.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 29.
39. Id. at 30.
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to Article II of the Constitution. ' '40 The Court has declined to adopt
this broad vision of presidential authority during emergencies, but the
extent of the power that the Executive does enjoy remains in dis-
pute.4' Likewise, it is only in light of rebellion or invasion that the
Constitution contemplates suspending the writ of habeas corpus.
42
Other countries' constitutions, and even the individual states in the
United States, are less categorical about the effects of the source of an
emergency upon the powers the government may exercise. Section 23
of the Argentine Constitution, for example, treating the "state of
siege," refers to "domestic disorder" and "foreign attack" as justifica-
tions for suspending constitutional guarantees, but the emphasis still
falls upon man-made crises.43 Sectiion 76, which has often provided
the basis for the Argentine Congress to delegate emergency economic
powers to the President, including in the wake of the fiscal crisis of
2001, 44 speaks in even more open-ended terms. According to this pro-
vision, any delegation of legislative power to the Executive is prohib-
ited, "save for issues concerning administration and public emergency,
with a specified term for their exercise and according to the delegating
conditions established by Congress. '45
At the state level, the power of the political branches during an
emergency stems from the broader notion of the "police power" re-
served to the states through the federalist structure of the Constitu-
tion.46 The concept of the state's police power is famously broad and
famously vague. As one scholar recently noted, "[D]espite the cen-
trality of the police power . . . an observation made nearly one hun-
dred years ago still holds true today: 'No phrase is more frequently
used and at the same time less understood.' ,,47 Through its compre-
hensive scope, the police power includes measures arising out of natu-
ral or economic disasters as well as those stemming from political
40. 542 U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality) (involving a U.S. citizen captured
during hostilities in Afghanistan and held in a South Carolina naval brig).
41. Id. at 517.
42. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2. Although the language of the Suspension Clause appears to
prescribe a textually specific limitation, ensuring that Congress will be able to use its power only
in cases of "Rebellion or Invasion," commentators disagree about whether courts would, or
should, deem the existence of rebellion or invasion justiciable. See generally Amanda L. Tyler, Is
Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333 (2006).
43. CoNsr. ARO. § 23.
44. See, e.g., Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. (declaring a public emergency in the terms
specified by Section 76 and modifying the exchange rate).
45. CONST. ARO. § 76.
46. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934).
47. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471,
471-72 (2004) (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, What Is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322,
322 (1907)).
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emergencies. The Court emphasized the police power's connection to
health, morals, and safety:
That there is a power, sometimes called the police power, which has
never been surrendered by the States, in virtue of which they may,
within certain limits, control everything within their respective terri-
tories, and upon the proper exercise of which, under some circum-
stances, may depend the public health, the public morals, or the
public safety, is conceded in all the cases. In its broadest sense, as
sometimes defined, it includes all legislation and almost every func-
tion of civil government. 48
Although, according to some commentators, the police power was co-
extensive with state sovereignty at the time of the founding, it is lim-
ited both by the federal government's constitutional supremacy and
by individual rights. 49
Even in the United States, although the text of the Constitution ap-
pears to contemplate granting emergency powers only in the case of
political crisis, if at all, the rhetoric of natural disaster has proved
more compelling in justifying particular kinds of action, especially
when taken in the name of the states' police powers. One dramatic
example involves the detention of numerous individuals in New Orle-
ans following Hurricane Katrina and their deprivation of the right to
counsel, speedy trial, and habeas corpus guarantees.5 0 A less visible,
but still important, deviation from the usual constitutional order has
been permitted when states claim that strict adherence to the dictates
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the prohibition it places on
discriminating against interstate commerce, will jeopardize the health
of the people or other life forms in the jurisdiction by importing pes-
tilence or disease. Thus, in Maine v. Taylor, the Court upheld a con-
viction under a Maine statute prohibiting the importation of out-of-
state baitfish, weighing heavily the expert testimony that the importa-
tion of these live baitfish would place "Maine's population of wild fish
... at risk by three types of parasites prevalent in out-of-state baitfish,
48. New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885) (citations omitted).
49. See Barros, supra note 47, at 497-98; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962) ("The term 'police power' connotes the time-tested conceptual limit of public
encroachment upon private interests."); New Orleans Gas Co., 115 U.S. at 661 ("Definitions of
the police power must, however, be taken, subject to the condition that the State cannot, in its
exercise, for any purpose whatever, encroach upon the powers of the general government, or
rights granted or secured by the supreme law of the land.").
50. See Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor Inmates Without Justice Since Hurricane, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2006, at Al. For an eloquent narrative description of the series of events leading
to these egregiously long detentions, see Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice
Collapse: The Constitution After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127 (2006).
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but not common to wild fish in Maine."' 51 Justice John Paul Stevens's
dissent in Maine v. Taylor suggests that the Court may have been too
quick to accept the state's claims of environmental necessity and im-
pending natural disaster:
[T]he invocation of environmental protection or public health has
never been thought to confer some kind of special dispensation
from the general principle of nondiscrimination in interstate com-
merce .... If Maine wishes to rely on its interest in ecological pres-
ervation, it must show that interest, and the infeasibility of other
alternatives, with far greater specificity. 52
Justice Stevens's counterstory indicates both one of the sources of the
persuasiveness of the rhetoric of natural emergency and one of its cen-
tral problems: the language of natural emergency suggests that the
government is faced with an exigency that permits only one means of
stopping disaster, rather than leaving open several alternative ap-
proaches. Furthermore, it tends-often erroneously-to divest the
government of responsibility for the onset of the emergency, attribut-
ing to nature what may in fact result largely from human
intervention. 53
The inadequacy of these justifications for granting the government
greater authority during natural emergencies does not, however, mean
that superior rationales exist in cases of political emergency. The
Constitution appears to distinguish between the different reasons for
the exercise of emergency powers, placing somewhat more emphasis
on political than on natural or economic triggers. This distinction,
however, lacks any self-evident normative justification. If one fol-
lowed the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, one might opine that the very
origin of government consists in man's fear of death by the hands of
51. 477 U.S. 131, 141 (1986). Emergencies affecting the public health might be treated simi-
larly. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health
and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 10-14 (2003).
52. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, political officials at-
tempted to place all the blame on nature. As one person in the White House insisted, "Normal
people at home understand that it's not the president who's responsible for this, it's the hurri-
cane." Elisabeth Bumiller, Democrats and Others Criticize White House's Response to Disaster,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A16. Professors Douglas Kysar and Thomas McGarity have
demonstrated some of the ways in which the disastrous results of Hurricane Katrina were, how-
ever, far from natural. Douglas A. Kysar & Thomas 0. McGarity, Did NEPA Drown New Orle-
ans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight, 56 DUKE L.J. 179 (2006); see
also CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRI-
CANE KATRINA 12-16, 23-34 (2005), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
UnnaturalDisaster_512.pdf.
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another man,54 and that the sovereign body should therefore be per-
mitted greater latitude in curtailing the consequences of violent emer-
gencies. 55 Because natural and financial disasters may, however, also
result in a scarcity of resources and ensuing violence, this rationale is
not entirely persuasive. A more attractive approach is to recognize
the sources for the exercise of emergency power as equally compel-
ling, whether military, economic, or natural.
Economic emergencies occupy a space of indistinction between
human-generated and natural disasters. While in Blaisdell the Court
approvingly quoted a passage that provided a lengthy analogy be-
tween financial and natural disorder, 56 President Franklin Roosevelt's
inaugural address of 1933 instead emphasized the relationship be-
tween war and economic distress, insisting that he needed "broad Ex-
ecutive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the
power that would be given ... if we were in fact invaded by a foreign
foe."'57 It is, in one respect, appealing to compare economic emer-
gency with natural disaster because the seemingly ineluctable charac-
ter of the latter endows the former with the appearance of
inevitability and removes the issue of responsibility for the crisis from
consideration. But from the vantage point of the constitutional
schema, as Roosevelt realized, such a comparison would diminish the
potential for the President to exercise extraordinary powers along the
lines of those employed during war or other military emergencies. 58
54. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 104 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651) (observing that the
worst aspect of the state of nature consists in the individual's "continuall feare, and danger of
violent death").
55. See id.
56. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 423 (1934) ("The present nation wide
and world wide business and financial crisis has the same results as if it were caused by flood,
earthquake, or disturbance in nature. It has deprived millions of persons in this nation of their
employment and means of earning a living for themselves and their families: it has destroyed the
value of and the income from all property on which thousands of people depended for a living, it
actually has resulted in the loss of their homes by a number of our people and threatens to result
in the loss of their homes by many other people, in this state .... (quoting Blaisdell v. Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. 249 N.W. 334, 340 (Minn. 1933) (Olsen, J., concurring))).
57. Scheuerman, supra note 33, at 1871 (quoting Roosevelt's 1933 inaugural address).
58. Agamben notes Roosevelt's strategic invocation of the metaphor of war and how he "was
able to assume extraordinary powers to cope with the Great Depression by presenting his ac-
tions as those of a commander during a military campaign." AGAMBEN, supra note 35, at 21. He
concludes from this situation that military and economic emergency cannot be differentiated
within the history of the twentieth century:
[F]rom the constitutional standpoint, the New Deal was realized by delegating to the
president an unlimited power to regulate and control every aspect of the economic life
of the country-a fact that is in perfect conformity with the already mentioned parallel-
ism between military and economic emergencies that characterizes the politics of the
twentieth century.
Id. at 22.
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III. Two APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW
Economic emergency is located at the logical intersection of two
different strands of scholarship on the rule of law-one arising in the
economic development context (economic development rule of law)
and one responding to the political turmoil ensuing from twentieth-
century declarations of states of emergency (emergency rule of law).59
So far, however, economic emergency has largely fallen in the gap be-
tween the two approaches. The economic development literature
demonstrates little concern with states of emergency, and the emer-
gency rule of law approach largely neglects the problems posed by
economic emergency.
Economic development rule of law, in its contemporary incarna-
tion, emerges largely out of Hayek's classic genealogy of the rule of
law in The Constitution of Liberty.60 Emergency rule of law addresses
59. See BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW
(Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (empirically assessing, among other things, the
role of courts in promoting economic development); Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-liberal Re-
forms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
513, 514-15 (2005) (observing that contemporary law and development projects are "character-
ized by attempts to reform the laws of developing countries" and that "[tihese reform projects
are often justified as, and incorporated into the general rubric of, 'Rule of Law projects"').
For discussions of the rule of law in the context of emergency, see DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006); David Dyzenhaus,
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDozo L.
REV. 2005, 2005-11 (2006) (deriving from Albert Venn Dicey's late nineteenth-century account
of the relationship between the rule of law and what we would designate an emergency the idea
that there can be no "legal black hole, in which the state acts unconstrained by law," and instead
that, even during emergency, "there is no prerogative attaching to any institution of state to act
outside of the law"); Antoine Garapon, The Oak and the Reed: Counter-terrorism Mechanisms
in France and the United States of America, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2041, 2043-46 (2006) (criticiz-
ing those who simply oppose the normal state of affairs to that of emergency, and maintaining
that "couching the debate in terms of a confrontation between Rule of Law and state of emer-
gency is too abstract"); Martin Loughlin, Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 183, 194-97 (2005) (describing the difficulties that the liberal state
encounters in emergency as involving a challenge to one conception of the rule of law); Schep-
pele, supra note 1, at 1009-13 (explaining Carl Schmitt's account of the sovereign's responsibility
during the "state of exception" as that of operating outside the liberal legal order precisely in
order to restore the rule of law through addressing the emergency and returning the polity to a
normal state of affairs); Waldron, supra note 8, at 1741-43 (contending that, even in the emer-
gency context, "it is the prohibition on torture, not the existence of a system for the legal author-
ization of torture, which is . . .archetypal of the rule of law").
60. See Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445,468 (2004)
(finding an empirical correlation between two of the criteria for the rule of law that Hayek
articulated in The Constitution of Liberty-judicial independence and constitutional review-
and economic freedom); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 508-11 (2001) (arguing that the empirical evidence that
systems based in the common law favor economic growth can be explained by a particular struc-
ture of government-an English rule of law system that favored individual property rights over
royal power); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 Sup. CT. ECON.
554 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:539
the disastrous results of the deployment of Article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution61 and the abuses of states of emergency in South Af-
rica,62 India,63 and the former Soviet bloc.64 Whereas the former in-
sists upon the desirability of safeguarding private property against
various contingencies, the latter focuses more on the abuses of pre-
ventive detention and the abrogation of normal democratic processes.
Although both strands of rule of law scholarship emphasize the im-
portance of limiting executive power and retaining basic judicial
processes at all times, the result of the economic development move-
ment logic is to privilege economic and property rights, whereas that
of the emergency strand is to place priority on the continued viability
of the democratic system and the basic prerequisites for participation
in it.65 Thus, the emergency approach to the rule of law may entail
fewer conflicts between insisting upon liberal rights and maintaining
the basis of a democratic system than the economic development one.
Those endorsing the emergency rule of law approach have achieved
significant international success. In the attempt to cabin emergencies
and minimize the possibility that they will imperil the very basis of a
state's legitimacy, some constitutions and international human rights
documents have included provisions designed to preserve particular
REV. 1, 4-5 (2003) (relying on Hayek's work as most forcefully articulating the "constitutional-
ism" version of the rule of law and insisting that "[tihe rule of law is ... inherently a classical
liberal concept that presupposes the need and desirability to constrain governmental actors and
maximize the sphere of liberty for private ordering, both in economic exchange as well as in the
voluntary institutions that comprise civil society").
61. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 20, at 15, 28-37 (detailing the instrumental role of Article 48
of the Weimar Constitution in enabling the Nazi party's rise to power and Schmitt's influential
interpretation of the provision).
Some late twentieth-century critics of Latin American constitutions traced their flaws in deal-
ing with emergency situations back to Schmitt and the Weimar Constitution, by either articulat-
ing an explicit genealogy or observing structural similarities. See Renato Cristi, The Metaphysics
of Constituent Power: Schmitt and the Genesis of Chile's 1980 Constitution, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
1749 (2000); Gabriel L. Negretto & Josd Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency
Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictator-
ship, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797 (2000).
62. See generally STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH
AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992) (detailing the ineffectiveness of South African courts at
upholding the rule of law by constraining the political use of emergency powers).
63. Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in In-
dia: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950-2000), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 413 (1998).
64. See generally Wiktor Osiatynski, Rights in New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111 (1994) (discussing the way in which the newer constitutions of
Eastern Europe deal with the threat of declarations of emergency in light of the history of such
declarations under Communism).
65. See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
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liberties as nonderogable during emergency. 66 The liberties protected
vary across these documents. Whereas countries like Russia enumer-
ate particular economic or property rights among those that are
nonderogable, 67 agreements like the American Convention on
Human Rights specify only personal or associational liberty rights.68
Many constitutions also constrain the extent to which an emergency
can alter the political order, sometimes by prohibiting constitutional
amendment during emergency, and sometimes by outlining other lim-
its on the extent to which the mode of government can be modified.
At the core of these guarantees lies a norm of preserving those subject
66. See SUBRATA Roy CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE PARIS
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 4-5 (1989) (elab-
orating some of the most critical problems spawned by an emergency situation: (1) "the govern-
ment ... is replaced by an authoritarian regime through a coup d'&tat"; (2) the "right to life" is
"imperilled"; (3) "preventative detention laws" are implemented (includes the suspension of
"habeas corpus and amparo," loss of right to counsel, loss of right to "a periodic review of the
detention order," "keeping the detainee incommunicado," and prolonged period without accusa-
tion); (4) "freedom of association and ... expression" are also suspended; (5) crimes are created
ex post facto; (6) the judiciary is "emasculat[ed]"; and (7) the state of emergency is continued for
"prolonged periods even after the circumstances which initially prompted the authority to pro-
claim it cease to exist"); Venelin I. Ganev, Emergency Powers and the New East European Con-
stitutions, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (1997) (discussing how some of the post-Communist
constitutions of Eastern Europe attempt to avoid the greatest dangers posed by states of emer-
gency by removing the possibility that the Executive will exercise emergency powers exclusively
or suspend the continued activity of the legislature).
67. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] art. 56; see also Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [Konst. RF] art. 34 (specifying "the right to freely use his or her abilities and property
for entrepreneurial" or "any other economic activity not prohibited by law"); Konstitutsiia Ros-
siiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] art. 40 (stating that "the right to a home" may not be restricted
during a state of emergency); A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALOKTMANYA art. 8 (including the
right to social security as nonderogable during emergency). But see CONST. VENEZ. art. 337
(stating that, when a "state of exception" has been decreed, "the guarantees consecrated by this
Constitution can be temporarily restricted, except those referring to the rights of life, prohibition
of isolation ... or torture, the right to due process, the right to information and the other intangi-
ble human rights").
68. The Convention states the following with regard to emergencies:
1. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence
or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under
the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination on the
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles:
Article 3 (Right to juridical personality), Article 4 (Right to life), Article 5 (Right to
humane treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from ex post
facto laws). Article 12 (Freedom of conscience and religion), Article 17 (Rights of the
family), Article 18 (Right to a name), Article 19 (Rights of the child), Article 20 (Right
to nationality), and Article 23 (Right to participate in government), or of the judicial
guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.
American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica." Signed at San Josd,
Costa Rica, on 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 152.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to the particular governmental regime while also maintaining the via-
bility of the political system as a whole.
On the economic development side, Hayek's genealogy of the rule
of law couches itself as a general defense of individual liberty, 69 and
alludes to the horrors of Nazi Germany, atrocities partially enabled by
the emergency provisions of the Weimar Constitution.70 As Professor
William Scheuerman has shown, these representations mask Hayek's
debt to Schmitt's critique of the democratic welfare state. 7' Indeed,
The Constitution of Liberty largely focuses upon freedom within the
economic sphere rather than endorsing a more expansive vision of lib-
erty.72 Not quite advocating that the state refrain from assuming any
role at all in the economic arena, Hayek instead insists that "it is the
character rather than the volume of government activity that is impor-
tant. ' 73 While objecting to certain types of government action, includ-
ing state monopolies and price and quantity controls, Hayek goes
beyond these particulars in the attempt to establish a conceptual un-
derpinning for the concept of the rule of law. Adherence to the rule
of law, he maintains, necessitates that "all coercive action of govern-
ment..., be unambiguously determined by a permanent legal frame-
work which enables the individual to plan with a degree of confidence
and which reduces human uncertainty as much as possible. '74 This
definition requires that laws should be general, rather than aimed at
particular individuals or interests, and that discretionary administra-
tive action should be limited in scope.75 Those who fall within
Hayek's heritage today emphasize constitutionalism, judicial review,
and a strong conception of the property rights of individuals. 76
Hayek's specifications that law be general and discretionary and ad-
ministrative action limited in scope, which are followed by many re-
cent commentators, including those who approach the project from
69. HAYEK, supra note 13.
70. Id.
71. WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITr: THE END OF LAW 209-24 (1999).
72. HAYEK, supra note 13.
73. Id. at 222.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 226 ("Regulations drawn up by the administrative authority itself but duly published
in advance and strictly adhered to will be more in conformity with the rule of law than will vague
discretionary powers conferred on the administrative organs by legislative action."); id. at 230
("Freedom of contract, like freedom in all other fields, really means that the permissibility of a
particular act depends only on general rules and not on its specific approval by authority.").
76. See supra note 60.
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the emergency side, 77 tend to run counter to the nature of government
action in emergencies that arise out of economic conditions and that
call for economic remedies. In the United States, the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) endows the President
with substantial powers over foreign economic exchange and the as-
sets of foreign countries under U.S. jurisdiction. 78  Although the
IEEPA grants Congress some authority to consult with and oversee
the President's administration of such an emergency, the President re-
tains a significant amount of discretion in implementing the powers
conferred by the IEEPA.79 Blaisdell, the Court's most involved elabo-
ration of the constitutional consequences of economic emergency, also
emphasizes the specificity of the inquiry that must be made in emer-
gency situations-a specificity that contravenes Hayek's insistence on
the general and nondiscretionary. According to Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes's opinion for the five-justice majority, "The constitu-
tional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the
power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to
particular conditions." 80
The tension between rule of law principles and legislation directed
towards stemming economic emergencies manifests itself most starkly
77. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democ-
racy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2001). Professor Rosenfeld explained his view of the rule of
law:
The "rule of law" is often contrasted to the "rule of men." In some cases, the "rule of
men" (or, as we might say today, "the rule of individual persons") generally connotes
unrestrained and potentially arbitrary personal rule by an unconstrained and perhaps
unpredictable ruler. For present purposes, however, even rule through law amounts to
the "rule of men," if the law can be changed unilaterally and arbitrarily, if it is largely
ignored, or if the ruler and his or her associates consistently remain above the law. At a
minimum, therefore, the rule of law requires fairly generalized rule through law; a sub-
stantial amount of legal predictability (through generally applicable, published, and
largely prospective laws); a significant separation between the legislative and the adju-
dicative function: and widespread adherence to the principle that no one is above the
law. Consistent with this, any legal regime that meets these minimal requirements will
be considered to satisfy the prescriptions of the rule of law in the "narrow sense."
Id. (citations omitted). But see Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000
Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1375-76 (2001) ("The new
rule of law [in constitutional regimes] takes the legal security of the legal subject to be a primary
aim of a constitutional order. The new rule of law, therefore, takes the point of view of the legal
subject and asks what effect the law has on her, what legal surprises she can reasonably be
expected to bear, and what legitimate expectations the legal subject has to use in her own de-
fense against the abusive operation of law itself.").
78. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000).
79. Id. § 1702(a)(1); see also Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 346
F.3d 264, 267-68 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining the President's power under the IEEPA to seize Iraqi
assets).
80. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
in the not infrequent accusation that the government has acted with
special interests in mind. This was the Court's concern in Allied Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, a Contract Clause case invalidating the
application of the Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act
to an employer, partly on the ground that the target of the legislation
was too narrowly circumscribed. 8'
The extent to which an economic development rule of law approach
appears incompatible with actions taken in the United States to ad-
dress economic emergency might suggest that constitutional adjudica-
tion should be modified to bring it into conformity with the treatment
of the rule of law in the economic development context. As Part IV
contends, however, there may be normative reasons why the emer-
gency rule of law approach leads to different consequences in particu-
lar constitutional systems than the economic development one.
Because the effort to promote the rule of law in the face of emergency
situations involves the attempt to preserve the conditions essential to
the survival and reproduction of the particular political system at is-
sue, the kinds of rights that remain inviolable during an emergency
reflect the polity's basic agreement on the kind of system it has estab-
lished and wishes to maintain.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN EMERGENCY
Whatever the underlying nature of the emergency-political, eco-
nomic, or natural-it may and often will involve government action
that affects constitutionally protected rights.82  The measures
deployed in dealing with emergencies of every variety may infringe on
81. 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978) (observing that the "narrow aim [of the statute] was leveled, not
at every Minnesota employer, not even at every Minnesota employer who left the State, but only
at those who had in the past been sufficiently enlightened as voluntarily to agree to establish
pension plans for their employees"); see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983) ("The requirement of a legitimate public purpose guarantees
that the State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to special interests.").
82. The kinds of rights affected by the emergency may not always correspond with the under-
lying sources of the emergency. A brief glance at the U.S. constitutional context demonstrates
that the origins of the emergency are not ineluctably tied to particular actions taken to stem its
progress. For example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court considered the
constitutionality of President Harry Truman's seizure of the steel mills, a seizure justified by the
context of the Korean War, and yet domestically implemented in a manner that at least one
Justice deemed a taking of property without just compensation. 343 U.S. 579, 630-32 (1952)
(Douglas, J., concurring). While the source of the asserted emergency powers was linked with
military exigency, the steps taken and the consequences for the targets of governmental action
were economic. Id. at 586 (majority opinion). It is also possible that an economic emergency
might generate responses that would restrict other kinds of liberties as well.
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constitutionally protected liberty, political, or economic rights. 3 In
the United States, the judiciary has tended to accede to executive or
legislative action limiting individual liberties during emergency, either
by postponing decision until after a crisis has concluded, or by af-
firming the necessity of the government's actions.84 Commentators
have disagreed about which approach is preferable. Certain critics,
like Professor Kathleen Sullivan, argue that we should continue to fol-
low constitutional norms during emergencies. 85 Others, like Profes-
sors Mark Tushnet and Oren Gross, prefer accommodation, either by
having the Supreme Court definitively distinguish between normal
and emergency situations or by permitting public officials to take mea-
sures during emergencies that will only subsequently be subject to le-
gal scrutiny.86
This Part argues that it would be normatively justifiable within the
U.S. constitutional system for the rigorous position that constitutional
norms should be followed during an emergency to coexist with mallea-
bility in the area of economic rights. The history of the Takings
Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause sug-
gests reasons why the U.S. constitutional schema might treat these
rights differently than certain other kinds. Constitutional systems that
enumerate rights that are nonderogable during emergency tend to se-
lect rights that are central to the preservation of the polity and the
individuals who comprise it-whether citizens or not.87 To the extent
that two of the foremost principles that the U.S. Constitution en-
shrines are a respect for the integrity of the political process and the
preservation of the possibility of democratic decisionmaking, special
protections for the rights associated with those principles may be justi-
fied during emergency. 88 The margins of the precise catalogue of such
rights may be debatable, but the core would include freedom from
83. See Bernadette Meyler, Civil Liberties in Emergency, I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES 494 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006) (detailing how First Amendment freedoms of
speech and association were curtailed by statute during World War I and the subsequent Red
Scare, as well as during the Cold War, elaborating upon relaxation of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures during times of emergency, and describing the
use of military tribunals and the deprivation of normal trial procedures during the Civil War and
World War II). For a more detailed discussion of infringements of economic rights, see infra
notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
84. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944). But see Exparte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
85. Christopher Reed, Are American Liberties at Risk?, HARV. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 99
(summarizing Sullivan's Tanner Lectures on "War, Peace, and Civil Liberties").
86. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003
Wis. L. REV. 273; Gross, supra note 3.
87. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
88. See generally ELY, supra note 9.
559
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
imprisonment without due process, without which individuals could
not even begin to exercise their political liberties.
While constitutionalism and judicial review are not synonymous
with the economic development vision of the rule of law, constitu-
tional protections for particular rights overlap to a significant extent
with economic development rule of law guarantees. In the United
States, these include the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause,
and the Takings Clause, or in settings like the Argentine, the princi-
ples that "[p]roperty may not be violated" and that "[e]xpropriation
for reasons of public interest must be authorized by law and previ-
ously compensated."8 9 To the extent that provisions for states of
emergency within certain constitutions permit the abrogation of their
own guarantees, they may serve to undermine the economic develop-
ment conception of the rule of law. Thus, in terms of the powers exer-
cised and the rights undermined, emergencies stretch this version of
the rule of law to its limits, if they do not exceed them altogether.
The right of habeas corpus is the only right that the U.S. Constitu-
tion explicitly contemplates suspending under certain circumstances. 90
The constitutions of other countries that textually allow for states of
emergency tend to permit more expansive intrusions on individual lib-
erties, yet they specify particular nonderogable rights. Under the Ar-
gentine Constitution, for example, constitutional guarantees may be
suspended during a state of siege, but the President is not authorized
to "pronounce judgment or apply penalties." 91 Furthermore, "his
power shall be limited, with respect to persons, to their arrest or trans-
fer from one place of the Nation to another, should they not prefer to
leave the Argentine territory. ' 92 In addition, provisions of the Ameri-
89. CONST. ARG. § 17.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
For a thorough treatment of several aspects of habeas corpus, see Symposium, The Great Writ:
Developments in the Law of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006).
91. CONST. ARG. § 23.
92. CONST. ARG. § 23; see also CONST. ALB. art. 175 (containing a specific list of nonderogable
rights and stating that "[t]he acts for declaring the state of war, emergency or natural disaster
must specify the rights and freedoms which are limited"); Tim Dockery, Note, The Rule of Law
over the Law of Rulers: The Treatment of De Facto Laws in Argentina, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1578, 1592-93 (1996) ("The Federal Government may not intrude upon liberties guaranteed by
the Argentine Constitution. Amongst these liberties are freedom of the press, the right to
unionize and strike, the inviolability of the home, the right to trial in front of a judge, and the
right to property, including vested rights. The State, however, may temporarily suspended [sic]
some of these constitutional guarantees during a state of siege." (citations omitted)).
[Vol. 56:539
2007] ECONOMIC EMERGENCY AND RULE OF LAW 561
can Convention on Human Rights insist on the nonderogability of
rights like habeas corpus during times of emergency.
93
During emergencies, the government may infringe upon economic
rights. In the United States, this has occurred most prominently with
respect to the Takings Clause and the Contract Clause. The language
of the Takings Clause itself permits the government some latitude;
rather than mandating that private property remain inviolate, it in-
stead specifies "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation. '94 Although Justice Robert Jackson's con-
currence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.-the opinion that has sub-
sequently proved the most influential-emphasized the scope of
presidential power during emergencies, Justice William Douglas's con-
currence insisted that, although war or other crisis situations might
authorize a more expansive deployment of federal power, this en-
hanced capacity could not extend so far as to undermine constitution-
ally protected rights like that of property.95 Because it was not
contemplated by Congress, the branch entitled to raise revenues, Pres-
ident Truman's seizure of the steel mills was likely to remain uncom-
pensated and therefore constituted an illegitimate implementation of
emergency powers. 96 Justice Douglas's view was not, however,
adopted by a majority of the Court, and subsequent Contract Clause
jurisprudence indicates that his reasoning might not hold sway.
Both at the Philadelphia Convention and elsewhere, opponents of
the Contract Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause raised the specter
of situations requiring emergency action by the government. They
imagined that these clauses would be strictly construed, and thereby
prevent the states or the political branches of the federal government
93. Although Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights explicitly allows for
derogation from the Convention's guarantees, it simultaneously specifies particular rights that
are nonderogable. See supra note 68. When interpreting this article in the Castillo Petruzzi case,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that the judicial guarantees of habeas
corpus and amparo could not be eliminated during times of emergency. Castillo Petruzzi Case,
Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Judgment of January 30, 1987, Set. A, No. 8.
Even though the emergency might justify placing restrictions on the right to individual liberty,
the court insisted on the inviolability of habeas corpus:
[I]n a system governed by the rule of law [it is necessary] for an autonomous and inde-
pendent judicial order to exercise control over the lawfulness of [emergency] measures
by verifying, for example, whether a detention based on the suspension of personal
freedom complies with the legislation authorized by the state of emergency. In this
context, habeas corpus acquires a new dimension of fundamental importance.
Id. $ 40.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629-34 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
96. Id.
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from taking the requisite measures. George Mason made this argu-
ment at the Convention:
Both the general legislature and the State legislature are ex-
pressly prohibited [from] making ex post facto laws; though there
never was nor can be a legislature but must and will make such laws,
when necessity and the public safety require them; which will here-
after be a breach of all the constitutions in the Union, and afford
precedents for other innovations. 97
Luther Martin expressed similar fears:
[T]here might be times of such great public calamities and distress,
and of such extreme scarcity of specie, as should render it the duty of
a government, for the preservation of even the most valuable part of
its citizens, in some measure to interfere in their favor, by passing
laws.., or authorizing the debtor to pay by instalments, or by deliv-
ering up his property to his creditors at a reasonable and honest
valuation. 98
Adjudication under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Contract Clause
has not, however, brought these concerns to fruition. Anxieties along
the lines that Mason articulated were settled by the Supreme Court's
1798 decision in Calder v. Bull, in which Justice Samuel Chase deter-
mined that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied only to retroactive crimi-
nal laws, not those affecting property.99 Justice James Iredell
provided support for this outcome: "The policy, the reason and hu-
manity, of the prohibition [on ex post facto laws], do not, I repeat,
extend to civil cases .... Some of the most necessary and important
acts of Legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principle,
that private rights must yield to public exigencies." 100
In Blaisdell, the case that considered the effect of a governmentally
posited emergency on the extent of a state's power over private con-
tracts, and which the Court recently cited in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,101 the
Court upheld a section of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law
extending the period during which a mortgagor could redeem prop-
erty after foreclosure against a Contract Clause challenge. 102 The ma-
97. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 640 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
98. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information, in SECRET PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONVENTION 3, 70 (Alston Mygatt 1845) (1788) (emphasis added).
99. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798).
100. Id. at 400 (Iredell, J., concurring).
101. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
102. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416-18, 446-48. Professor James Henretta has insightfully situated
the Blaisdell decision within the context of Chief Justice Hughes's jurisprudence, arguing that
"Hughes's support for rights-economic or personal-was always qualified by his respect for the
legitimately imposed demands of the community" and that "Hughes's communitarian side came
to the fore in the controversial Minnesota Moratorium Cases (1934)." James A. Henretta,
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jority's analysis in Blaisdell can be extended to the broader context of
economic rights, and demonstrates potential distinctions between
these and other constitutionally protected rights.103
In its treatment of the emergency context, the Blaisdell Court re-
fused to assume that the emergency grants the state additional power
or authorizes the temporary abrogation of constitutionally guaranteed
rights-as might be the case with habeas corpus, in the context of an
adequate congressional suspension-and instead maintained that the
Contract Clause remains constant during normal and emergency situa-
tions: "Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not in-
crease granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed
upon power granted or reserved." 10 4 Blaisdell thus fits more within a
Sullivan rather than a Tushnet or Gross paradigm of constitutional
emergency. 105
At the same time, Blaisdell does not suggest a completely inflexible
constitutional order. Rather, analogizing the Minnesota legislation in
the case to the historical role of courts of equity to modulate the rigid-
ity of common-law principles, Blaisdell insists that "[tlhe constitu-
tional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the
power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to
particular conditions." 10 6 In more concrete terms, the Court opined
that the generality of the Contract Clause's terms permits contextual
interpretation of its meaning: "[W]here constitutional grants and limi-
tations of power are set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad
outline, the process of construction is essential to fill in the details." 0 7
Although the Court did not distinguish between economic and other
kinds of rights, its reasoning is particularly compelling with respect to
the former. Indeed, one can deduce from Blaisdell a constitutional
regime for emergency in which noneconomic rights are subject to in-
Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 115, 153
(2006). There are several other important accounts of the historical context. See, e.g., G. ED-
WARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING
THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998).
103. A subsequent case explained the procedures for analysis under the Contract Clause that
Blaisdell set forth: "The Court balanced the language of the Contract Clause against the State's
interest in exercising its police power, and concluded that the statute was justified." Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 & n.11 (1983) ("The Court
listed five factors that were then deemed to be significant in its analysis: whether the Act (1) was
an emergency measure; (2) was one to protect a basic societal interest, rather than particular
individuals; (3) was tailored appropriately to its purpose; (4) imposed reasonable conditions; and
(5) was limited to the duration of the emergency." (citing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-47)).
104. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425.
105. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
106. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426.
107. Id.
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flexible application while the Constitution's restrictions on economic
measures are more liberally construed.
The two principal bases for separating economic rights from other
constitutional rights are the disparate effects of delay in the respective
spheres and the substrate out of which the respective rights are exer-
cised. The duration of emergencies has been a central concern for
critics of emergency regimes. A declaration of emergency posits an
exception to the normal regime, but the danger is that, as in South
Africa under Apartheid, the emergency will be normalized and be-
come permanent. Many constitutions therefore prescribe temporal
limits for declared emergencies. 108 To the extent that emergency does,
in fact, represent a departure from a normal order to which the polity
will subsequently return, it stands in a complex relation to delay. It
could be argued that the enforcement of rights that would not be en-
tirely vitiated by delay should be susceptible to postponement during
emergency.
As Blaisdell emphasized, the emergency measures that the Court
approves do not deprive parties of their overarching contractual
,rights, but merely postpone the realization of these rights through par-
ticular remedies.' 0 9 One might analogize such a postponement to the
effects of the suspension of habeas corpus, which Professor Trevor
Morrison has recently argued defers a remedy but does not dissipate
the underlying rights.110 It is due to a different relationship to tempo-
ral delay that rights like access to habeas corpus remain during emer-
gency, in the absence of a constitutional provision like the Suspension
Clause that allows them to be placed on hold, while exercise of rights
protected by clauses like the Contract Clause may be subject to post-
ponement without such constitutional specification. The Court in
Blaisdell discussed the principle underlying the Contract Clause:
This principle precludes a construction which would permit the
State to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruc-
tion of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But it does
not follow that conditions may not arise in which a temporary re-
straint of enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose
of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the
range of the reserved power of the State to protect the vital inter-
ests of the community. 111
108. See, e.g., CONST. ALB. art. 173 (limiting the duration of states of emergency to sixty days).
See generally ELLMANN, supra note 62.
109. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
110. Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi's Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 COR-
NELL L. REV. 411 (2006).
111. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. at 439.
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In general, economic loss is compensable, as the unfavorable treat-
ment of suits seeking injunctive relief for simple economic harm sug-
gests. Although substantial detriment may accrue to an individual or
collectivity that is unable to realize the value of its assets for a particu-
lar period of time, it is possible that violations of economic rights
could be remedied by payment at a later time. This is not the case
with rights like habeas corpus, which from its initial inception in En-
glish statutes was aimed at undoing the harms caused by delays in
bringing detained individuals to court.112 Furthermore, many mea-
sures taken during economic emergencies and directed at stabilizing
the economy are precisely those of postponement, or involve other
attempts to manipulate the timing of inflation or deflation, or coordi-
nate price alterations in accordance with a national or global trend." 13
Another, broader rationale also underlies the Blaisdell decision and
suggests that, even where economic rights, and not simply their timely
realization, are substantially affected by emergency measures, these
rights should not be interpreted with the same inflexibility as other
individual or political rights. Because the economic sphere is funda-
mentally one of interdependence, in which the values of contract and
property are contingent on the state of the underlying economy, it
may not even be possible for courts to enforce economic rights in the
face of fiscal crisis. It is partly in this connection that the Blaisdell
Court analogized economic crisis with natural disaster-although aris-
ing from different sources, both kinds of emergency may present im-
possibilities of performance:
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes
the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual re-
112. The preamble to the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 states the justification for the
statute:
Whereas great delays have been used by sheriffs, gaolers and other officers, to whose
custody any of the king's subjects have been committed for criminal or supposed crimi-
nal matters, in making returns of writs of habeas corpus to them directed by standing
out an alias and pluries habeas corpus and sometimes more, and by other shifts to avoid
their yielding obedience to such writs, contrary to their duty, and the known laws of the
land, whereby many of the king's subjects have been and hereafter may be long de-
tained in prison in such cases where by law they are bailable, to their great charge and
vexation.
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.). The Act itself provides stringent time limits
within which those to whom writs of habeas corpus are addressed must act. Id. But see
Kontorovich, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416-17
(1983) (explaining Kansas's interest in ensuring that the timing of deregulation of interstate and
intrastate natural gas markets would coincide); United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361
U.S. 39, 57 (1959) (describing the manner in which the Labor Management Relations Act at-
tempts to stem emergency by inserting a delay).
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lations are worth while,-a government which retains adequate au-
thority to secure the peace and good order of society. This principle
of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary re-
siduum of state power has had progressive recognition in the deci-
sions of this Court.114
Likewise, even if technically possible, the strict enforcement of partic-
ular economic rights may not be desirable in light of the damage that
this will cause elsewhere in the economy. Just as economic benefits
arise out of the interdependent structure of the economy, economic
ills must also be shared:
The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain,
the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the
interrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of
our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of
the organization of society in order to protect the very bases of indi-
vidual opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only
the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that
those of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later
been found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly
affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of one party
to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means
to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all
depends.' 1 5
These two sets of reasons help to distinguish economic from other in-
dividual and political rights, and suggest why balancing a state's emer-
gency interests against the nature of its infringement upon contract
rights might supply an appropriate method of adjudication in the Con-
tract Clause context, but not in that of habeas corpus. They also indi-
cate that the insistence upon enforcing economic rights equally with
other rights even during emergency-as the Argentine Supreme
Court did in declaring a 2001 reduction in pension benefits unconstitu-
tional1 16-may not be the only principled position for a constitutional
court to take, and that the rule of law may be maintained alongside a
flexible interpretation of economic rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The convergence of economic development and emergency rule
of law approaches upon the situation of economic emergency might
suggest that it is precisely at moments of economic crisis that we
should adhere most rigorously to the rule of law. As this Article has
114. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435.
115. Id. at 442.
116. Tobar, Leonidas c/E.N. Ministerio de Defensa-Contadurfa General del Ejdrcito-Ley
25.453 s/amparo ley 16.986.
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argued, however, the U.S. constitutional system has historically
treated economic rights as malleable during emergency, a stance that
is normatively defensible within the context of the United States. Fur-
thermore, rather than envisioning the rule of law as abrogated at such
moments, the Court has suggested that a flexible view of economic
rights can coexist harmoniously with the rule of law. When economic
emergencies threaten, Ulysses' mast may bend, but neither release
him from its mooring nor itself snap.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:539568
